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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM:
A REPLY TO HAZLETT
PhilipJ.Weiser* and Dale N. Hatfield"

INTRODUCTION

As the many citations to his prior article, Spectrum Policy Reform and
the Next Frontierof Property Rights,' indicate, Thomas Hazlett is a preeminent scholar of the law and economics of wireless spectrum. Given that
our inspiration for the article was to highlight some key shortcomings in the
scholarly debate (and in the policy arena), we are encouraged that Professor
Hazlett has engaged our argument with a very thoughtful and interesting
response. 2 From our vantage point, however, Hazlett's response does not
contradict, but rather underscores and sharpens some of the key points that
we made in our article. By so doing, it brings into focus the critical issues
that scholars and policymakers need to wrestle with in the years ahead. To
frame our response, we will first address issues related to the development
of spectrum property rights and remedies, then discuss the need to "zone"
the spectrum, and conclude by discussing the optimal institutional strategy
for managing spectrum property rights.
I.

SPECTRUM PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Let us begin by highlighting a few key points where we agree with
Hazlett's cogent analysis of spectrum regulation. First, we heartily agree
with Hazlett that the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC")
models for specifying property rights in spectrum will necessarily be and
should be incomplete and imperfect.3 As Hazlett puts it, policymakers
should not let the "ideal be[] the enemy of the good" when defining spectrum property rights.4 Rather, the FCC should focus on developing a reasonably sound basis for parties to assess the limits on their right to use spec* Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado. We thank John Bergmayer
for first rate research assistance.
Adjunct Professor of Telecommunications, University of Colorado.
Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontierof Property
Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 549 (2008).
2 Thomas W. Hazlett, A Law & Economics Approach to Spectrum Property Rights: A Response
to Weiser and Hatfield, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 975 (2008).
3 See id.
at 982-84.
4 Id. at 984.
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trum and not attempt to specify that right precisely. In fact, as we note, entitlements that are muddy around the edges have a salutary benefit-they
create an incentive for parties to reach reasonable agreements with one another.5
Second, we are sympathetic to Hazlett's critique of the "interference
temperature" proceeding6 and thus recognize the reasons why this effort
failed.7 Notably, the effort to create a new measurement system out of
whole cloth and not to base it on the existing uses was highly questionable
as both an economic and political matter.8 In stressing the FCC's decision
to close the proceeding, we do not quarrel with the judgment that the model
proposed by the FCC was flawed.9 Rather, we find telling and unfortunate
that the agency acted without evincing any concern about the existing legal
framework that governs "harmful interference."'" Moreover, as a result of
its inaction, the FCC has left in place a framework whereby firms like
Qualconim can afford to pursue lengthy and expensive ad hoc proceedings
to define their rights more sharply, but upstarts do not have the resources to
do so, thereby ensuring inefficient uses of spectrum and less innovation."'
In that light, Hazlett's praise for the FCC's ability to provide a more specific ruling in that case in less than two years time' 2-again, a ruling that
less well-heeled firms could not obtain-only underscores that the current
failings of the spectrum policy regime have led commentators to define
success downward in this area.
Third, building on the important insight that the right to use spectrum
will necessarily be somewhat uncertain, we agree with Hazlett that the patent law analogy is instructive in a number of ways. '" First, like the patent
system, we believe that spectrum regulation should employ some form of a
front-end system to give parties a level of assurance about their use of spectrum. 4 In particular, instead of applying the Patent and Trademark Office's
("PTO") model of patent-application review or even a post grant challenge
procedure, we suggest that the FCC can develop models that provide a level
5 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 607 n.282 (citing Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1095-96
(1995)).
6 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 995-96.
7 See Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage Interference
and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands,
22 F.C.C.R. 8938, 8938 (May 4, 2007), available at 2007 WL 1306800.
8 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 558-67.
9 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 995-96.
10 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 565-66.
11 Id.at 566-67.
12 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 999 ("[T]he FCC accommodated Qualcomm's request in less than two
years, a fairly timely response.").
13 See id. at 983, 997-98.
14 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1,at 591.
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of front-end assurance to users of spectrum. 5 Second, like the patent system, we believe that such a front-end assurance should not be absolute 6parties should use actual litigation to evaluate whether, in fact, interference
exists.17 The possibility of such litigation over uncertain rights, however,
means that the available remedies must be tempered to avoid granting a
broad injunction that would give a party far more leverage than necessary to
compensate it for the relevant harm.'
As for a core area of disagreement, we believe that Hazlett understates
greatly the nature of the concern we identify in our Denver TV station hypothetical.19 In his view, the possibility of interference beyond an identified
boundary-traditionally, the Class B contour where signals can be reached
50% of the time at 50% of the areas along the contour 2 -is "occasional"
""
when "radiation skips over close-in areas to swamp distant receivers ....
22
This depiction (of a "stochastic" episode, as Hazlett puts it ) misstates the
nature of the challenge. Indeed, beyond the Class B boundary, say, to a
contour where 20% of the areas along the contour will receive the signal
20% of the time, the signal still may well create interference with another
user licensed in that location. Our point, moreover, is not that the FCC's
current policy of a widely spaced allocations table is appropriate or that
wide swaths of terrain should be left as so-called "white spaces." To the
contrary, we emphasize that, given the inevitable conflicts-especially with
services like AM radio broadcasting-the legal response must impose more
tailored remedies.23 It should not, by contrast, call for relatively onerous
demands (e.g., a requirement not to "trespass" again) that would make operating a particular service far more expensive. 24

15 Id. In particular, we proposed a safe-harbor based on an engineering-based predictive model of
signal strength (at least for some period of time). Id.at 591-95. Alternatively, and like the patent system,
the use of a predictive model could also provide the basis for a conclusion that a particular use of spectrum was presumptively lawful. See id.at 592.
16

Id.at 595-98 ("[T]h[ese safe-harbor] requirements should not be inviolate ....

17
18

See id. at 600-02.
See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 582; Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Prop-

erty or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 795 (2007).
19 See Hazlett, supra note 2, at 986-88.
20 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 559.
21 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 986.
22

id

23 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1,at 591 ("[The] new system should ensur[e] that remedies
are calibrated to address only actual harms .
24

Id.at 557, 591.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ZONING THE SPECTRUM

The current uses of the wireless spectrum reflect past decisions far
more than current demands for the resource. Thus, we cannot disagree with
Hazlett's argument that the spectrum used by broadcast TV stations (particularly in the UHF band) could be put to higher value uses in many
cases.25 Under our proposal, spectrum licensees, such as TV broadcasters,
could continue operating as they do currently as well as make the type of
trades Hazlett identifies.26 By contrast, a regime that either allows injunctions of the kind used in trespass law (as opposed to patent or nuisance law)
or imposes a unitary property right of the kind used in the cellular bands
(which, as a practical matter, require low powered, cellularized uses) would
effectively make the existing broadcast service unsustainable. 7
In calling for a zoning of the spectrum, we must emphasize that we
envision an approach that is not service specific. Our proposed system
would not, for example, specify TV broadcasting and rule out services like
Qualcomm's MediaFLO.2" Rather, it would simply create different levels of
flexibility that would allow higher powered services with more spillover in
some bands and lower powered services with less spillover in others.29 Consequently, a service like MediaFLO (which is lower powered than traditional TV broadcasting) could be introduced in a band authorized for TV
broadcasting, but not vice versa."
A central dividing line, between the approach suggested by Professor
Hazlett and ours, is our view that certain industry facts are more complex or
open to change than he suggests. Hazlett maintains, for example, that the
most productive use of "[t]he 25 MHz of cellular bandwidth used by Verizon Wireless to provide wireless phone service in Phoenix is the same 25
MHz the Verizon network uses in Portland, Oregon. Both frequency spaces
are far more valuable as 25 MHz bands controlled by one network than as
small slices owned by thousands of different entities ..
3. This claim is
potentially misleading on at least three scores. First, for reasons we discussed at length, Hazlett's choice of case study-wireless telephone service-may well differ from other uses of spectrum, ranging from a broadcast TV service to a railroad's internal network to an air-to-ground system
25 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 990-91, 1014-15.
26 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 603-04. As we note, however, we do not address
whether such trades would be subject to a windfall tax that would address concerns about the increased
flexibility granted to licensees originally granted spectrum for free provided they offered only the authorized service. Id.at 554 n.27.
27

Id. at 581,595.

28

See id. at 593-94.

29

Id.

30 See id.
31 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 979.
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by a private airport.32 In each of these other cases, the use of a particular
band of spectrum is likely to differ considerably more dramatically than in
the wireless telephony case study.33 Second, even in the wireless telephony
context, the identity of the owners of particular spectrum bands is likely to
be more dispersed than Hazlett suggests. Consider, for example, the AWS
auction, where a number of different entities purchased the same set of licenses within the same state.34 Finally, even if Hazlett's conclusion is true
for a particular point in time-say, today-it quite possibly may not be true
at other points, raising the question whether the legal system should lock in
or privilege particular uses.
III. THE OPTIMAL INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY FOR MANAGING SPECTRUM
PROPERTY RIGHTS

We are, as we readily acknowledge, uncomfortable with the FCC's
legacy of public choice sins.35 Our response, however, differs from Hazlett's condemnation of all administrative agencies as doomed to making too
few Type I errors36 (i.e., protecting against interference unnecessarily or, as
we put it, viewing interference as a virus37 ). In fact, the PTO is an administrative agency widely condemned for making the opposite mistakeallowing too much interference, in the form of overlapping patent rights, by
failing to reject more patent applications.3" The problem, we submit, is that
the FCC has historically viewed its mandate as industry protectionism in
return for public interest obligations,39 whereas the PTO has viewed its
mandate as "granting more patents." In establishing an agency to manage
spectrum property rights, be it a standalone one or in the FCC, the essential
challenge will be to charter its mission as ensuring the most effective use of
spectrum to maximize the welfare of consumers.4
32

Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 588-91 ("[The success of property rights in the cellular

bands] rests on a particular set of circumstances that is unlikely to exist across the board.").
33 id.
34 See FCC, Advanced Wireless Services Auction: Winning Bids (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-06-1882A2.pdf (showing that the winners of
licenses covering Colorado were Hemingford Coop. Tel. Co., SpectrumCo, Union Tel. Co., AWS Wireless, Command Connect, Atlantic Wireless, Cingular AWS, T-Mobile License, and Red Rock Spectrum
Holdings).
35 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 555, 561-67.
36 Hazlett, supra note 2, at 993.
37 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 558-61.
38 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards:Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1827 (2007) ("Today, anti-troll forces are also claiming that the
Patent Office issues far too many low quality patents.").
39 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 1, at 555.
40 Id. at 591.
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We do not believe that prescribing the charter of a new agency or a
new mandate within the FCC to manage spectrum property rights will be a
simple matter. To the contrary, it is likely the most important challenge in
making a reformed system of spectrum policy work effectively. Consider,
for example, our discussion of why certain would-be win-win transactions
(i.e., Coasian bargains) may not take place and why agency oversight and
regulation may be necessary to facilitate progress.4 ' The margin for mischief in such matters is enormous. At the same time, any regime that would
refuse to empower an agency (or court) to oversee the upgrading of legacy
equipment to ensure more efficient and technically advanced uses of spectrum would, in effect, allow the past to veto the future.
CONCLUSION

Spectrum policy is as difficult as it is important. The press and even
many policymakers are intimidated by spectrum policy reform because
"spectrum is an invisible resource with apparently mysterious and even
magical properties. 42 In the scholarly arena, a tempting response is to suggest that if only spectrum were "propertized" and left to the market, the sins
of administrative regulation would be remedied. Those sins are real, but the
challenges in defining, enforcing, and managing property rights cannot be
addressed with a simple analogy to land and the law of trespass.
Going forward, policymakers and scholars must focus on how to define rights and remedies tailored to this unique medium, address what models of interference protection (e.g., zoning) are warranted, and design (as
well as implement) an institutional strategy that can oversee the uses of
wireless spectrum. We appreciate the time and care that Professor Hazlett
took to engage these questions and begin to launch this important debate
that many industry players would rather not have. After all, many of the
existing incumbents are comfortable with and protected by the current system of regulation. It is thus up to scholars, policymakers, the press, and the
public to question the premises of our current system and pave the way for
reform.

41 Id.at 573 n.133 (explaining the role of an agency in imposing certain cooperative arrangements
on parties unable to come to an agreement).
42 J.H. Snider, Is the Spectrum Just Too Complex For Reporters?,NIEMAN WATCHDOG, Feb. 21,

2008, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfmo?fuseaction=askithis.view&askthisid=327.

